Bid opening in e-auction is efficient when a homomorphic secret sharing function is employed to seal the bids and homomorphic secret reconstruction is employed to open the bids. However, this high efficiency is based on an assumption: the bids are valid (e.g. within a special range). An undetected invalid bid can compromise correctness and fairness of the auction. Unfortunately, validity verification of the bids is ignored in the auction schemes employing homomorphic secret sharing (called homomorphic auction in this paper). In this paper, an attack against the homomorphic auction in the absence of bid validity check is presented and a necessary bid validity check mechanism is proposed. Then a batch cryptographic technique is introduced and applied to improve the efficiency of bid validity check.
Introduction
In a sealed-bid auction scheme, each bidder chooses his evaluation from a number of biddable prices and submits it to some auctioneers, who then open the bids and determine the winning price and winner(s) according to a predefined auction rule. The commonly applied auction rules include first bid auction (the bidder with the highest bid wins and pays the highest bid), Vickrey auction (the bidder with the highest bid wins and pays the second highest bid) and the ρ th bid auction (the bidders with the ρ − 1 highest bids win, pay the ρ th highest bid and each get an identical item). The first-bid auction and Vickrey auction can be regarded as special cases of the ρ th bid auction, which is a general solution. An auction must be correct, namely the auction result is strictly determined according to the auction rule. Fairness is necessary in any auction such that no bidder can take advantage over other bidders. Usually, bid privacy must be kept in an auction scheme, which means in the course of bid opening no losing bid is revealed.
When bid privacy must be kept in a non-interactive auction 1 , an efficient bid opening function is homomorphic secret reconstruction [8, 10, 9, 15] . To adopt this bid opening function, one-selection-per-price principle and homomorphic bid sharing mechanism must be employed. Each bidder has to submit a bidding selection at every biddable price to indicate whether he is willing to pay that price ("YES" or "NO"). Every selection is sealed with a homomorphic secret sharing function, so that the auctioneers can use a homomorphic secret reconstruction function to determine whether the number of bidders willing to pay a price is over ρ without revealing any bidding selection. When this homomorphic bid opening mechanism is applied together with binary search strategy, the winning bid can be determined very efficiently.
In homomorphic e-auction, each bidding selection must be in some special range (certain values standing for "YES" or "NO") to guarantee correctness and fairness of the auction. So validity of the bids must be proved by the bidders and verified publicly. However, all the existing homomorphic auction schemes [8, 10, 9, 15] ignore bid validity check. An attack to compromise correctness and fairness in the absence of bid validity check is presented in this paper to demonstrate necessity of bid validity check. Then implementation of bid validity check in homomorphic auction is proposed. As proof and verification of bid validity is highly inefficient, a batch cryptographic technique is proposed and applied to improve the efficiency of bid validity check. With the help of a new 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer technique, validity of bids can be efficiently proved and verified.
Symbols and Parameters
The following symbols and parameters will be used in this paper.
• w represent the number of biddable prices in auction.
• E() denotes encryption.
• D() denotes decryption.
• x : the bit length of integer x.
• ExpCost(x) denotes the number of multiplications needed to calculate an exponentiation with an x-bit exponent. ExpCost y (x) denotes the number of multiplications needed to calculate the product of y exponentiations with x-bit exponents.
• Two large primes p and q are chosen, such that p = 2q + 1 and w < q.
Integer g 0 is a generator of Z * p . Integers g and h are generators of G, the subgroup with order q of Z * p , such that log g h is unknown.
• Definition 1 | | is the absolute-value function from Z * p to G defined by
′ q ′ where p ′ and q ′ are large primes. The public key is e where e ∈ Z * N . The private key is d, such that ed = 1 mod φ(N).
• KN(x) denotes knowledge of x; KN(x|Cond) denotes knowledge of x satisfying condition Cond.
Related Work
Homomorphic auction and two related cryptographic tools, batch verification and oblivious transfer are recalled in this section. The two tools will be improved and then employed later in this paper to optimize homomorphic auction.
Bid Sharing
Let p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p w stand for the biddable prices in an auction. A bid in a homomorphic auction [8, 10, 9, 15 ] is a vector m = (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m w ). Each component in m is either "YES" or "NO", respectively represented by a non-zero integer and zero. Bid m is shared among the auctioneers. A threshold secret sharing function with a threshold t is employed to share the bid, such that the bid can be recovered if t shares are available. Due to additive homomorphism of the secret sharing algorithm, bid opening at any price can be implemented using homomorphic secret reconstruction without revealing any selection. The bid sharing must be verifiable, so it can be verified that the shares can be used to recover a unique secret bid. In the usual sharing verification mechanism, the secret holder hides the secret in a commitment, so that each share holder can verify that his share can be used to recover the secret hidden in the commitment. The commitment function must be hiding (the secret is not revealed) and binding (the secret cannot be changed). In a bid sharing, the commitment function must be information-theoretically hiding as each bidding selection can only be chosen from two values standing for "YES" and "NO" respectively. So general purpose VSS schemes, such as [4] and [13] are not suitable as they do not employ information-theoretically hiding commitment. As suggested in [15] , a VSS scheme with information-theoretically hiding commitment like [14] must be employed. In [15] , the most advanced homomorphic auction scheme, every m j is shared as follows where 1 ≤ j ≤ w.
(1) A polynomial f j (x) = m j + t k=1 a j,k x k mod q is chosen and a j,k for k = 1, 2, . . . , t are random integers.
k mod q is chosen where b j,k for k = 1, 2, . . . , t are random integers. (4) Share s j,l = (m j,l , u j,l ) = (f j (l), h j (l)) is encrypted and sent to auctioneer A l for l = 1, 2, . . . , M. (5) As the secret sharing is homomorphic, homomorphic secret reconstruction (see [15, 14] for details) can be performed at any price to recover the sum of selections at that price in the bid opening phase. (6) The bidder publishes commitments e j,k = g a j,k h b j,k mod p for k = 1, 2, . . . , t and e j,0 = g m j h u j mod p. (7) Correctness of the sharing can be verified against the commitments. s j,l is a correct share to recover the secret bid committed in e j,0 if and only [14] for correctness and soundness of this sharing verification.
Batch Verification Techniques
Suppose it is required to verify y j = g x j mod p where x j ∈ z q , y j ∈ z * p , for j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , w. The easiest solution is to calculate g x j for j = 1, 2, . . . , w and compare the results with y j for j = 1, 2, . . . , w, the computation cost of which is w × ExpCost(log 2 q). An intuitive idea to batch verify the w equations is to test w j=1 y j = g w j=1
x j . Harn [6] used this idea to construct a batch verification for DSA. However this method is not reliable since it is easy to pass the verification with incorrect pairs y j = g x j as pointed out by Bellare et al [2] .
Bellare et al [2] proposed three batch verification schemes for common base exponentiation: RS (random subset) test, SE (small exponent) test and Bucket test. In SE test, the batch verification equation is x j s j where s j = L for j = 1, 2, . . . , w and L is a security parameter. RS test is a special case of SE test when = 1. Bucket test is a variant of SE test and more efficient when the batch is of great size (all the pairs (x j , y j ) for j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , w are divided into 2
T buckets and SE test is performed in each the bucket). In this paper we focus on SE test.
Bellare et al proved that if y j ∈ G for j = 1, 2, . . . , w and q is a prime, SE test costs w + L + wL/2 + ExpCost(log 2 q) multiplications, while Bucket test costs
T −1 (T + 2) + ExpCost(log 2 q)) multiplications. They use SE test or Bucket test together with a slightly modified DSS scheme to achieve efficient batch signature verification. Bellare proved that the probability that an incorrect batch can pass the batch verification (SE test or bucket test) is no more than 2 −L . Although SE test and Bucket test are sound with an overwhelmingly large probability, their soundness is based on an assumption: y j ∈ G for j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , w. Otherwise incorrect pair ((x j , y j ) with y j = g x j ) can pass the batch verification with a non-negligible probability. Bellare et al seem to ignore the impact of this assumption.
Boyd et al [3] pointed out that the theorems in [2] are correct, but their application to DSS verification is inappropriate because there is no efficient way to verify y j ∈ G for j = 1, 2, . . . , w. If y j ∈ G is verified for j = 1, 2, . . . , w, w exponentiations with full-length exponents are costed in the verification, which compromise the efficiency improvement of the batch verification. When y j / ∈ G, the probability for an incorrect batch to pass the verification can be much greater than 2 −L (When y j = g q 0 g x j , the probability is 0.5). This observation greatly restricts the application of Bellare's batch verification techniques. However, it is illustrated in [1] that carefully-designed SE test is still useful in some special applications.
Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious transfer is a function involving two parties: a sender and a chooser. The sender possesses a few secrets. The chooser chooses one of the secrets and gets it from the sender. The sender does not know which secret the chooser gets and the chooser has no knowledge of any other secret.
When there are only two secrets to choose from in an oblivious transfer, it is called 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer [12] . When there are more than two secrets to choose from in an oblivious transfer, it is called 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer [11, 17] . Most oblivious transfer schemes are based on ElGamal encryption. Juels and Szydlo proposed an 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer based on RSA encryption [7] , which is more efficient than those based on ElGamal encryption.
Necessity and Implementation of Bid Validity Check
Necessity and implementation of bid validity check in homomorphic auction are discussed in this section.
Necessity of Bid Validity Check
Bid validity check is necessary in homomorphic auction although it is not adopted in the existing homomorphic auction schemes [8, 10, 9, 15] . In a Vickrey auction or the ρ th -bid auction, a constant non-zero integer must be chosen to represent the "YES" selection, so validity of bid must be checked. Otherwise, it is impossible to test whether the number of "YES" selections at a price is at least 2 (in Vickrey auction) or ρ (in the ρ th -bid auction). Although bid validity has never been mentioned in any first-bid auction scheme, an invalid bid can compromise correctness and fairness of a first-bid auction scheme.
For example, three colluding bidders B 1 , B 2 and B 3 may perform the following attack against first bid auction where in a bidding choice no-zero integer Y and 0 stand for "YES" and "NO" respectively.
• B 1 , B 2 and B 3 estimate that the other bidders' bids are lower than p µ while their own evaluation is p ν , which is higher than p µ . They try to win the auction and pay as low as possible.
• B 1 bids Y at prices no higher than p µ and zero at other prices; B 2 bids Y at prices no higher than p ν and zero at other prices; B 3 bids −Y at prices higher than p µ but no higher than p ν and zero at other prices.
• If all other bidder submits a bid lower than p µ as expected, the sum of choices at p µ is non-zero and the sum of choices at prices higher than p µ is 0. So p µ is the winning price and there is a tie between B 1 and B 2 . One of them gives up and the other wins at p µ .
• If other bidders' highest bid, p H is no lower than p µ but lower than p ν , the sum of choices at p H is larger than zero and the sum of choices at prices higher than p H is 0. So some other bidder wins the auction at p H together with B 2 . B 2 disputes the tie and publishes his bid to win the auction at p ν .
• If other bidders' highest bid is p ν , the sum of choices at p ν is larger than zero and the sum of choices at prices higher than p ν is 0. So some other bidder draws with B 2 at p ν . B 2 still has a chance to win the auction in the following tie-breaking operation.
With this attack, either B 1 or B 2 win unless another bidder submits a bid higher than the attackers' evaluation. The attackers can pay a price lower than their evaluation if the other bids are as low as the attackers expect. So, no matter what auction rule is applied, bid validity check is always necessary.
Implementation of Bid Validity Check
Bid validity check in homomorphic auctions can be implemented using zero knowledge proof techniques. When the verifiable bid sharing mechanism in [15] as described in Section 3.1 is employed, the bidder has to prove that the bid committed in (e 1,0 , e 2,0 , . . . , e w,0 ) is valid. For simplicity, integer 1 is used to represent a "YES" selection. So when the bid is the δ th biddable price, zero must be committed in e 1,0 , e 2,0 , . . . , e δ−1,0 while one must be committed in e δ,0 , e δ+1,0 , . . . , e w,0 . Validity of the bid can be proved using the following zero-knowledge proof.
and
where e (1) and (2) can be proved, the bid committed in (e 1,0 , e 2,0 , . . . , e w,0 ) is valid.
Proof: Proof (1) indicates that either zero or one is committed in e ′ j,0 for j = 1, 2, . . . , w. Proof (2) indicates that the sum of the committed bidding selections in (e (1) and (2) can be proved. As e ′ j,0 = e j,0 /e j−1,0 for j = 2, 3, . . . , w and e ′ 1,0 = e 1,0 , zero is committed in e 1,0 , e 2,0 , . . . , e δ−1,0 and one is committed in e δ,0 , e δ+1,0 , . . . , e w,0 for a δ in {1, 2, . . . , w} if and only if (1) and (2) can be proved.
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The normal method to verify equation (1) is to perform w instances of proof of 1-out-of-2 knowledge of logarithms based on [16] and [5] . This method is highly costly. The computational cost for a bidder is e ′ j,0 for 3wExpCost(|q|) + 2w multiplications. The computational cost of a verifier (auctioneer or observer) is (4ExpCost(|q|) + 2)nw multiplications where n is the number of bidders.
Efficiency Improvement of Bid Validity Check
The bid validity check mechanism in Section 4.2 is so inefficient, that it becomes an efficiency bottleneck. So, it is optimised in efficiency in this section. The efficiency improvement is based on two new cryptographic primitives: a new batch verification primitive and a new 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer technique, which are extensions of the existing schemes described in Section 3.
New Batch Verification Primitive
Theorem 2 is applied to verify knowledge of log g y i where y i ∈ G for i = 1, 2, . . . , w. Unless specified, any multiplicative computation in Theorem 2 and its proof occurs in G with a modulus p.
Theorem 2
Otherwise, given any t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t v−1 , t v+1 , . . . , t w , any efficient deterministic algorithm can calculate log g w i=1 y t i i for at most one t v . This deduction implies among the 2 wL possible combinations of t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t w , only 2 (w−1)L of them enable an efficient deterministic algorithm to calculate log g w i=1 y t i i , which leads to a contradiction: the probability that there exists an efficient deterministic algorithm to calculate log g w i=1 y t i i with random t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t w is no more than 2 −L .
So there exists an efficient deterministic algorithm to calculate
So there is an efficient deterministic algorithm to calculate log g y v . Therefore, there is an efficient deterministic algorithm to calculate log g y i for i = 1, 2, . . . , w as v can be any integer in {1, 2, . . . , w}. i . The probability that log g w i=1 y t i i is known while log g y i for some i in {1, 2, . . . , w} is unknown is no more than 2 −L .
New 1-out-of-w Oblivious Transfer
A 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer protocol must be employed in the optimised bid validity verification mechanism. In the application of oblivious transfer in this paper, only one value is transferred, so the 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer protocol is performed only once and security requirement for multiple transfers need not be considered. However, the employed 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer protocol must be very efficient to achieve high efficiency in the bid validity verification mechanism. So a new 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer based on RSA encryption is designed by extending [7] to 1-out-of-w circumstance while keeping its high efficiency. After the extension, the new protocol only provides one-time security, but is very efficient.
The sender has w secrets s 1 , s 2 , . . . s w and the chooser wants to know s δ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , w}. They run the following protocol where the chooser's operation is denoted as OT 1(s δ ) and the sender's operation is denoted as OT 2(s δ ).
(1) Initialisation: The sender sets up RSA encryption, keeps private key d and publishes public key e and N where ed = 1 mod φ(N). He randomly selects ǫ i,j from Z N for i = 1, 2, . . . , log 2 w and j = 0, 1 and publishes s 
Properties of this 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer protocol are as follows.
(1) Correctness
If the sender and the chooser follow the protocol, the chooser can obtain s δ as
(2) Privacy of the chooser As y i,0 and y i,1 for i = 1, 2, . . . log 2 w are distributed uniformly, the sender has no knowledge of δ. Namely, information-theoretic privacy of the chooser is achieved. (3) Privacy of the sender It is widely believed that composite factorization is intractable and without the knowledge of the factorisation of N it is intractable to find d given e and N. So the chooser can get only one of ǫ i,0 and ǫ i,1 for every i in {1, 2, . . . , log 2 w}. Therefore, the chooser does not know any other secret than s δ . (4) High efficiency
• The cost to the sender is 2 log 2 w exponentiations and n(log 2 w − 1) + 2 log 2 w multiplications; • The cost to the chooser is (log 2 w)/2 + 1 divisions and 1.5 log 2 w + 1 multiplications on average if e is a small integer as suggested in [7] .
In this paper, this 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer protocol will be applied to transfer L-bit integers, which are smaller than N.
Batch Verification of Bid Validity
A method to improve efficiency of bid validity check is to apply the batch ZK proof-verification technique in Section 5.1 to batch prove and verify validity of a bid. For example, according to Theorem 2, Proof (1) and Proof (2) can be batched into
where the bid is the δ th biddable price and t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t w are random L-bit integers. A simple implementation of Proof (3) is presented in Figure 1 , where A and B represent a verifier (auctioneer) and a prover (bidder) respectively and t j is much smaller than q. Although this approach is efficient, the verification equation
mod p reveals that the bid is the δ th biddable price. So the proof in Figure 1 is not a ZK proof of (3). Instead, it is a ZK proof of KN(log h ( w j=1 e ′ t j j,0 )/g t δ ), which reveals δ. Therefore, the batch proof-verification protocol in Figure 1 must be modified, so that the bid is not revealed. The following is a modified four-move protocol.
• In the first move (the added move) the prover and the verifier perform an oblivious transfer. Firstly, the verifier (auctioneer as the sender in the oblivious transfer) chooses challenges t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t w and keep them secret. Then the prover (bidder as the chooser in the oblivious transfer) use the 1-out-of-w oblivious transfer protocol in Section 5.2 to obtain t δ from the verifier while he obtains no knowledge of other secret challenges.
• The prover's commitment is the second move, which is a commitment of two secrets: t δ and a random integer r.
• The last two moves (challenge and response) are the same as the last two moves in Figure 1 .
• The verification equation is slightly modified so that t δ does not appear explicitly in the verification equation and the bid is not revealed.
The protocol is described in detail in Figure 2 . A and B represent a verifier (auctioneer) and a prover (bidder) respectively. According to Theorem 2 and the privacy property for the sender in the 1-out-of-w transfer, the protocol in Figure 2 proves
Note that in his proof of the binding property of his VSS in [14] , Pedersen assumed that e j,0 is in the cyclic subgroup G. So although it is not explicitly described, e j,0 for j = 1, 2, . . . , w must have been verified to be in G for the sake of verifiability of secret sharing. Therefore, e ′ j,0 ∈ G for j = 1, 2, . . . , w and the condition in Theorem 2 is satisfied. This proof is much more efficient than Proof (1) in Section 4.2, but is as effective as it. In addition to Proof (2) (which can be proved and verified using a standard Schnnor ZK proof protocol [16] ), Proof (4) guarantees that (1, 0, 0 . . . , 0) is committed in e 
where r is randomly chosen from Z q . A → B : t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t w where t j ∈ {0, 1} L for j = 1, 2, . . . , w B → A : z = s − r mod q where s = This new proof and verification cost O(log 2 w) full-length exponentiations and is much more efficient than before batch verification is applied.
Analysis
In this section we show that the optimised bid validity check mechanism using batch verification is correct, sound, zero knowledge and efficient.
Security Analysis
Security properties of batch verification of bid validity is analysed in this section. Correctness of the batch verification is obvious, namely when the bidders are honest their validity proof can successfully pass the verification. Other security properties like soundness and zero knowledge are not so obvious.
Theorem 3
The proof protocol in Figure 2 is honest-verifier ZK.
Proof: Without any help from the prover, the verifier can generate a proof transcript as follows. He randomly selects OT 1 (t δ ) ,OT 2 (t δ ), z from Z q and t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t w from {0, 1} L . Then he calculates a = w j=1 e ′ t j j,0 /h z . Thus he independently gets a proof transcript (OT 1 (t δ ), OT 2 (t δ ), a, t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t w , z). In this transcript, every integer is uniformly distributed. If the verifier is honest and randomly selects his challenge t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t w , the proof protocol in Figure 2 also generates a proof transcript (OT 1 (t δ ), OT 2 (t δ )a, t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t w , z), in which every integer is uniformly distributed. These two transcripts are indistinguishable. 2
Theorem 4
The proof protocol in Figure 2 is sound. More precisely, if the
where r is randomly chosen from Z q A → B : t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t δ−1 , t δ+1 , . . . , t w where t j ∈ {0, 1} L for j = 1, 2, . . . , w B → A : z = s − r mod q where s = verifier is honest and the proof passes the verification in the protocol in Figure 2 with a non-negligible probability, the proof together with Proof (2) guarantees that (1, 0, 0 . . . , 0) is committed in e To prove Theorem 4, the following two lemmas are proved first.
Lemma 1 If a prover can pass the protocol in either Figure 3 or Figure 2 , then he can pass the other as well.
Proof: As the oblivious transfer protocol guarantees privacy of sender, in the protocol in Figure 2 the prover only gets t δ in the first two steps and has no information about t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t δ−1 , t δ+1 , . . . , t w until the fourth step. So in protocols in Figure 2 and Figure 3 the prover tries to prove the same statement while given the same knowledge. Therefore, he can pass the other as well if he can pass one of them. 2
Lemma 2
The protocol in Figure 3 is sound. More precisely, if the verifier is honest and the prover can pass the verification in the protocol in Figure 3 with a non-negligible probability, then he knows log h e Proof: As the prover can pass the verification in the protocol in Figure 3 with a non-negligible probability, the prover must be able to give two responses z and z ′ to two different challenges t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t δ−1 , t δ+1 , . . . , t w and t
with a probability larger than 2 −L . Otherwise, the prover can give correct response to at most one challenge with a non-negligible probability, while the probability that he can give a correct response to any other challenge is no larger than 2 −L . This deduction implies a contradiction: when an honest verifier chooses a random challenge from all the 2 wL possible challenges the probability that the prover can pass the verification is no more than 1/2 wL + 2 −L (2 wL − 1)/2 wL , which is negligible.
Dividing (5) with (6) yields
which is correct with a probability larger than 2 −L . So, the prover knows log h (
′ with a probability larger than 2 −L .
As the verifier is honest and chooses t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t δ−1 , t δ+1 , . . . , t w and t Figure 2 passes the verification with a non-negligible probability when the verifier is honest, the prover can also pass the protocol in Figure 3 with the same nonnegligible probability when the verifier is honest.
So according to Lemma 2, the prover knows log h e 
Efficiency Analysis
Suppose an inverse with modulus has the same cost of an exponentiation with the same modulus and e, the RSA public key in the oblivious transfer, is a small integer. In Table 1 , the cost of bid validity check with normal method and batch solution respectively are compared. An example is given in the table for this comparison, where w = 1024, |N| = |q| = 1024 and L = 20. Suppose ExpCost(x) = 1.5x and ExpCost y (x) = x + 0.5xy.
The batch solution is much more efficient in computation, while the probability that an invalid bid is accepted is no more than 2 −L = 2 −20 . The larger w is, the greater advantage the batch solution has. In auction, the number of biddable prices must be large enough to avoid tie situation, especially when many bidders take part in the auction. So computational improvement by batch verification is very helpful in large-scale auctions.
Conclusion
Bid validity check is necessary in homomorphic auction schemes to prevent attack against correctness and fairness. However, bid validity check is usually costly. Batch verification technique and oblivious transfer can be combined to significantly improve efficiency of bid validity check in homomorphic auction schemes without compromising bid privacy.
